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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to give, for each substitutable preference prole of the many-
to-one matching model, a systematic procedure to distinguish between those orderings (on
pairs of subsets of workers in the preferences of rms) that are irrelevant for the set of
stable matchings from those that, if inverted, the set of stable matchings changes.
The many-to-one matching model consists of two disjoint sets: the set of institutions
(like rms, colleges, schools, and hospitals) and the set of individuals (workers, students,
children, and medical interns). The assignment problem consists of matching each rm to
a subset of workers and each worker to at most one rm in such a way that if a worker is
matched to a rm, this rm is matched to a subset of workers that contains this worker
(workers as well as rms may remain unmatched). The assignment problem is not trivial
because agents have preference relations on potential mates. Each worker has a strict
preference relation on the set of rms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched, and each
rm has a strict preference relation on the family of subsets of workers (which includes
the empty set, interpreted as being unmatched). A preference prole is a list of preference
relations, one for each agent.
Stability has consistently been used as the solution concept for matching markets. In
particular, many entry-level professional labor markets use a centralized stable mechanism
which collects agentspreference relations and proposes a stable matching. The National
Resident Matching Program, that matches each year around 20,000 hospital positions and
medical students for internship in the USA and Canada, is a well-known example of a
centralized stable mechanism.1 In many countries students are matched to positions in col-
leges or schools through centralized mechanisms as well.2 But also civil servants, sportsmen,
researchers, and many others are often matched using centralized mechanisms.3
To be stable, a matching has to be individually rational: agents have to be assigned
1See Roth (1984a), Roth and Peranson (1999), and Roth (2002) for a description and analysis of this
market.
2See, for instance, Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez (2003), Abdulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, and Roth (2005), Ab-
dulkadiro¼glu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005 and 2006).
3See Roth and Xing (1994) for a discussion of many centralized matching markets. Romero-Medina and
Triossi (2005) perform a strategic analysis of a matching market in Spain in which young researchers are
matched to research institutions by means of a partially centralized mechanism.
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to acceptable partners; otherwise, if matching is voluntary, the match will not last. In
addition, to be stable, a matching has to be pairwise stable: there should not exist any pair
formed by a rm and a worker that are not matched to each other, such that the worker
would prefer the rm to the current match and the rm would like to add the worker to
the set of workers that it is matched to (perhaps after ring some of these workers).
In the marriage model and the college admissions problem the set of stable matchings
is always non-empty.4 However, for some preference proles of the general many-to-one
matching model the set of stable matchings is empty. All these preference proles share the
feature that some rm considers some workers as complements. Kelso and Crawford (1982)
dened the notion of substitutability as the absence of complementarities. Substitutability
says that the desirability of a worker in a particular set does not come from the presence of
another worker in that set; i.e., the rm still wants to hire the worker even when the other
worker is not available anymore. If the preference prole is substitutable (i.e., each rm
has a substitutable preference relation) the set of stable matchings is non-empty. Hence,
we will assume that preference proles are substitutable.
The aim of this paper is to understand when the set of stable matchings changes in
response to changes in the preference relations of rms. Take a preference prole and a rm.
Consider two subsets of workers S and S 0 and assume that the rm prefers S to S 0. Replace
in the preference prole the preference relation of the rm with a new preference relation
in which the rm prefers S 0 to S and all other orderings remain the same. Depending on
the preference prole and the two subsets S and S 0 the set of stable matchings may either
change or remain the same. We will give a procedure to identify those orderings between
pairs of subsets of workers that, if inverted, the set of stable matchings remains the same for
all possible preference relations of the other agents; i.e., orderings between pairs of subsets
of workers that from the point of view of stability are irrelevant. Hence, centralized stable
mechanisms do not need to use as input this irrelevant information. Specically, given the
substitutable preference relation Pf of rm f on all subsets of workers, dene a partial
order Pf as follows:5 given two subsets of workers S and S 0, we declare that S is preferred
4These two models were introduced and studied in Gale and Shapleys (1962) seminal paper. The
marriage model is the one-to-one matching model and the college admissions problem is the many-to-one
matching model with quotas and responsive preferences (a meaningful subclass of substitutable preferences).
5A (strict) preference relation of a rm is a complete, transitive, and antireexive binary relation on
2
(according to the partial order Pf ) to S 0 if and only if S is the best subset (according to
Pf) among all subsets of S [ S 0; otherwise, they are not ordered by Pf . It turns out that
this partial order is a semilattice on a subfamily of subsets of workers.6 We refer to it as the
semilattice of the choice of the union. We will prove that it is individually rational, ordered,
and closed. A semilattice is individually rational if the partially ordered family of subsets
of workers is composed of those sets that are preferred to their subsets. A semilattice is
ordered if for all subsets S and S 0 in the partially ordered family of subsets of workers, the
least upper bound (according to Pf ) of S and S 0 coincides with the least upper bound
(according to Pf ) of all subsets of S [ S 0, and in addition, this set is contained in S [ S 0.
A semilattice is closed if all subsets of each set in the family are themselves elements
of the family. Now, suppose we start with an individually rational, ordered, and closed
semilattice and we (strongly) extend it to a preference relation by maintaining all orderings
of the partial order and declaring a particular order on all unordered pairs. Observe that
in general there will be many di¤erent strong extensions of a semilattice. However, all
strong extensions will be substitutable. Yet, for each strong extension we can obtain its
corresponding semilattice of the choice of the union. Then, it turns out that all these
semilattices are the same and coincide with the original one from which we obtained the
strong extensions.
All these properties are relevant because they will be useful to prove that we can partition
the set of substitutable preference proles by grouping together in equivalence classes all
proles including, for each rm, preference relations that are strong extensions of the same
semilattice. Note that, given a preference relation Pw of worker w, we could similarly
construct the partial order Pw on the set of acceptable rms. However, this partial order
Pw is trivially a semilattice on the set of acceptable rms because it coincides with the
initial complete preference relation Pw (on the set of acceptable rms) since the choice of the
union of two di¤erent rms is always equal to the best of the two rms. Thus, from the point
of view of the workerspreference relations all orderings (between pairs of acceptable rms)
the family of all subsets of workers. A partial order of a rm is a reexive, transitive, and antisymmetric
binary relation on a family of subsets of workers. Observe that, in general, a partial order is not complete;
i.e., some pair of subsets of workers may not be comparable.
6A semilattice is a partially ordered set with the property that the least upper bound of any pair of
elements in the set exists.
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are relevant for the set of stable matchings. This is the reason why preference relations of
workers will remain xed while identifying equivalence classes of preferences of rms. In
particular, Theorem 1 says that the set of stable matchings is invariant across substitutable
preference proles that belong to the same equivalence class. Hence, from the point of view
of stability information contained in the complete preference relations of rms is irrelevant
since only those orderings kept by the prole of semilattices of the choice of the union
matter. Thus, centralized stable mechanisms could disregard this irrelevant information.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the preliminary notation and
denitions. In Section 3 we describe our results by means of an example, dene the notion
of a semilattice, and state its main properties. In Section 4 we dene the notion of a strong
extension of a semilattice and present some preliminary results. In Section 5 we state and
prove the main result of the paper: Theorem 1, an invariance result, under substitutable
preference proles, for the set of stable matchings. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude with
a general description of the procedure that partitions the set of substitutable preference
proles.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Agents, Preference Relations, and Matchings
There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of n rms F = ff1; :::; fng and a set of m
workers W = fw1; :::; wmg. Generic elements of both sets are denoted, respectively, by f
and by w. A generic agent will be denoted by v 2 V  F [W . Firms will hire sets of
workers (possibly empty) and workers will work for at most one rm. Thus, each worker
w 2 W has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation Pw over F [ f;g, and
each rm f 2 F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation Pf over 2W .
Preference proles are (n+m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by
P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm). Given a preference prole P and fs preference relation
P 0f , we will denote by (P
0
f ; P f ) the original preference prole P after replacing Pf by P
0
f .
Given a preference relation of a rm Pf , the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set
by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker Pw, the rms
preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. By convention, we declare the empty
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set as being acceptable for all agents.
A market is a triple (F;W; P ). The assignment problem consists of matching workers
with rms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility
that both rms and workers may remain unmatched. Formally,
Denition 1 A matching  is a mapping from the set F [W into the set of all subsets
of F [W such that for all w 2 W and all f 2 F :
1. Either j (w)j = 1 and  (w) \ F 6= ; or else  (w) = ;:
2.  (f) 2 2W .
3.  (w) = ffg if and only if w 2  (f) :7
LetM be the set of matchings. We say that agent v 2 F [W is unmatched at matching
 if  (v) = ;. Otherwise, v is matched at . Given a matching  and a subset of agents
C  V , dene (C) = fv 2 V j (v) \ C 6= ;g:
Let Pf be a preference relation of rm f . Given a set of workers S  W , let Ch (S; Pf )
denote rm fs most-preferred subset of S according to its preference relation Pf . Generi-
cally we refer to this set as the choice set.
2.2 Stability and Substitutable Preferences
Let (F;W; P ) be a market. A matching  is blocked by worker w if ;Pw (w). A matching 
is blocked by rm f if  (f) 6= Ch ( (f) ; Pf ). A matching is individually rational if it is not
blocked by any individual agent. We will denote the set of individually rational matchings
by IR(P ). A rm-worker pair (f; w) is a pairwise block of matching  if w =2  (f),
fPw (w), and w 2 Ch ( (f) [ fwg ; Pf ).
Denition 2 A matching  is stable if it is not blocked by any individual agent nor any
rm-worker pair.
Given a preference prole P , we denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ). There are
preference proles with the property that the set of stable matchings is empty. Following
the literature we will assume that rms have substitutable preference relations.
7With a slight abuse of notation, we often use (w) as an element of F , and write (w) = f instead of
(w) = ffg:
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Denition 3 A rm fs preference relation Pf satises substitutability if for any set S
containing workers w and w0 (w 6= w0), if w 2 Ch (S; Pf ) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw0g ; Pf ).
A preference prole P is substitutable if for each rm f , the preference relation Pf
satises substitutability. For any substitutable preference prole P , S (P ) 6= ; and, for all
 2 S (P ), FRfRfW for all f 2 F and WRwRwF for all w 2 W .8
The deferred-acceptance algorithm dened by Gale and Shapley (1962) produces, for
each substitutable preference prole P , either F or W depending on the side of the
market that makes the o¤ers. At any step of the algorithm in which rms make o¤ers,
each rm f proposes to the choice set of the set of workers that have not already rejected
f during previous steps, while a worker w accepts the most-preferred rm among the set
of current o¤ers plus the rm provisionally matched to w in the previous step (if any).
The algorithm stops at the step when either all o¤ers are accepted or rms have no more
acceptable subsets of workers to whom they want to make an o¤er; the provisional matching
becomes then denite and is the stable matching F . Similarly, if workers make o¤ers, the
outcome of the algorithm is the stable matching W .
3 Invariance of the Set of Stable Matchings and Semi-
lattices
3.1 An Example
Our goal is to identify conditions on substitutable preference proles under which the set
of stable matchings is invariant. Specically, we aim to give a simple procedure to partition
the set of substitutable preference proles into equivalence classes with the property that
all proles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. Before proceeding, we
present an example that illustrates the main ideas of this procedure.
8See Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984b). The matchings F and W are called, respectively,
the rms-optimal stable matching and the workers-optimal stable matching. We are following the convention
of extending preferences from the original sets (2W and F [f;g) to the set of matchings. However, we now
have to consider weak preference relations since matchings  and 0 may associate to an agent the same
partner. This weak preference relation of agent v is denoted by Rv.
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Example 1 Let F = ff1; f2g be the set of rms and W = fw1; w2; w3g be the set of
workers. Consider the substitutable preference prole P = (Pf1 ; Pf2 ;Pw1 ; Pw2 ; Pw3),
Pf1 Pf2 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3
fw3g fw1; w2g f1 f1 f2
fw1; w2g fw1; w3g f2 f2 f1
fw1g fw2; w3g ; ; ;
fw2g fw3g
; fw1g
fw2g
;;
where we only list acceptable partners in decreasing order (all missing subsets of workers
in the corresponding preference relations of rms are not acceptable and, by individual
rationality of stable matchings, their relative orderings are irrelevant from the point of
view of stability). It is easy to check that S(P ) = f1; 2g, where 1(f1) = fw1; w2g,
1(f2) = fw3g, 2(f1) = fw3g, and 2(f2) = fw1; w2g: Consider now the two proles P 0
and P 00 in which only f2s preference relation Pf2 has changed to P
0
f2
and to P 00f2, respectively;
that is, P 0 = (P 0f2 ; P f2) and P
00 = (P 00f2 ; P f2), where
P 0f2 P
00
f2
fw1; w2g fw1; w3g
fw2; w3g fw1; w2g
fw1; w3g fw2; w3g
fw3g fw3g
fw1g fw1g
fw2g fw2g
; ;:
Note that Pf2 and P
0
f2
di¤er only on the ordering of the sets fw1; w3g and fw2; w3g while
Pf2 and P
00
f2
di¤er only on the ordering of the sets fw1; w2g and fw1; w3g. However, the
replacement of Pf2 by P
0
f2
does not produce any e¤ect on the set of stable matchings since
S(P 0) = S(P ) = f1; 2g; while the replacement of Pf2 by P 00f2 changes the set of stable
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matchings since S(P 00) = f1g (observe that 2 =2 S(P 00) because (f2; w3) is a pairwise block
of 2).
We will have to di¤erentiate between irrelevant versus relevant orderings (i.e., compar-
isons between two sets of workers) in Pf . The ordering SPfS 0 is irrelevant for stability if for
each P 0f that agrees with Pf except on the ordering of S and S
0, S(P 0f ; P f ) = S(Pf ; P f )
for all P f ; otherwise, the ordering SPfS 0 is relevant for stability. For this purpose, we will
have to consider a partial order Pf , which will leave as unordered those pairs that are irrel-
evantly ordered by Pf ; keeping all relevant orderings in Pf .9 Second, to understand which
orderings are irrelevant and which ones are relevant we will have to look at very special
properties of the partial order Pf . For instance, we associate with the preference relation
Pf2 a partial order Pf2 on the subfamily of subsets APf2 = fS 2 2W j S = Ch(S; Pf2)g
(i.e., APf2 = 2
Wnfw1; w2; w3g) as follows:10 for all S; S 0 2 APf2 ,
S Pf2 S 0 if and only if S = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf2):
Observe that APf2 = AP 0f2 and for all S; S
0 2 APf2 , S Pf2 S 0 if and only if S P 0f2 S
0;
namely, Pf2=P 0f2 ; because
9Alkan (2001) also considers partial orders instead of complete preference relations to study the lattice
structure of the set of stable matchings of a many-to-one matching model.
10Blair (1988) uses a similar construction to establish the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings
in the many-to-many model introduced and studied by Roth (1984b and 1985). Fleiner (2003) uses a
partial order to study the set of stable matchings as xed points. Echenique and Oviedo (2006) also uses
this partial order to identify a condition (strong substitutability) on preference relations that guarantee the
non-emptyness of the set of set-wise stable matchings in the many-to-many matching model.
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Pf2=P 0f2
;
fw1g fw3g fw2g
fw1; w3g fw2; w3g
fw1; w2g
where S ! S 0 means that S 0  S (S 0  S and S 6= S 0) and omitted nonempty subsets are
unordered with respect to all other subsets of APf2 : However,
P 00f2
;
fw1g fw2g fw3g
fw1; w2g fw2; w3g
fw1; w3g
Observe that, since fw1; w3g P 00f2 fw1; w2g but fw1; w2g Pf2 fw1; w3g, P 00f2 6=Pf2 : Con-
9
sider
P 000f2
fw1; w2g
fw1; w3g
fw2; w3g
fw2g
fw1g
fw3g
;;
which di¤ers from Pf2, P
0
f2
, and P 00f2. Since P 000f2=P 0f2=Pf2 6=P 00f2 we will be able to
deduce, as a consequence of Theorem 1, that S(P 000f2 ; P^ f2) = S(P
0
f2
; P^ f2) = S(Pf2 ; P^ f2)
for all P^ f2 ; and that there exists P f2 such that S(P
00
f2
; P f2) 6= S(Pf2 ; P f2). 
Subsection 3.2 below presents formally the notion of a semilattice which will be needed
to state our results. We adapt this notion to our setting where the partially ordered set is
a (nite) subfamily of subsets of workers.11
3.2 Partial Orders, Joins, and Semilattices
Let A be a non-empty subfamily of subsets of W containing the empty set; i.e., A  2W
and ; 2 A. A partial order  on A is a reexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary
relation on A; that is, for all S; S 0; S 00 2 A, S  S, [S  S 0  S 00] =) [S  S 00], and [S  S 0
and S 0  S] =) [S = S 0]. Given S; S 0 2 A we write S  S 0 to denote that S  S 0 and
S 6= S 0. Then,  is a transitive and antireexive (S  S for no S) binary relation on A.
The set S is called acceptable (according to ) if S  ;. Given a partial order  on A and
a subfamily X  A, dene the set of upper bounds of X as ubX = fS 2 A j S  S 0 for
all S 0 2 Xg and the least upper bound of X as lubX = T , where T 2 ubX and, for all
T 0 2 ubX, T 0  T: Given a partial order  on A, dene the binary operation _ on A as
follows: for S; S 0 2 A, S _ S 0 = lubfS; S 0g. Observe that, in general, lubfS; S 0g may not
exist; for instance, consider W = fw1; w2; w3g and let A = ffw1g; fw2g; fw3g; ;g and  be
such that fw1g  fw3g and fw2g  fw3g. Then, lubffw1g; fw2gg does not exist because
ubffw1g; fw2gg = ;. However, by the antisymmetry of , if it exists, the lub is unique.
11See Birkho¤ (1979) for a general denition.
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Denition 4 The triple L = (A;;_) is a semilattice if, for all S; S 0 2 A, lubfS; S 0g
exists.12
Observe that although the binary operation _ follows from the partial order , it will
be useful to refer to both in the notation of the semilattice. This is because there is an
(equivalent) algebraic approach where, instead of starting from the partial order , one can
start from a binary operation as follows. A join _ on A is an idempotent, commutative,
and associative binary relation on A; that is, for all S; S 0; S 00 2 A; S_S = S, S_S 0 = S 0_S,
and S _ (S 0 _ S 00) = (S _ S 0)_ S 00. Given a join _ on A; dene the partial order  on A as
follows: for all S; S 0 2 A;
S  S 0 if and only if S = S _ S 0: (1)
Indeed, both approaches are equivalent in the sense that the partial order obtained from _
is  (i.e., the partial order from which _ is dened).
3.3 The Semilattice of the Choice of the Union: Denition and
Properties
Let f 2 F and Pf be given. Assume Pf is substitutable. Dene the family of subsets of
workers
APf = fS 2 2W j S = Ch(S; Pf )g (2)
and the partial order Pf on APf as follows: for all S; S 0 2 APf ;
S Pf S 0 if and only if S = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): (3)
It is easy to see that for any preference relation Pf the binary relation Pf is a partial order
on APf ; i.e., Pf is reexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. Moreover, Proposition 1 below
12Specically, we should have referred to L = (A;;_) as a join-semilattice. Moreover, if a join-
semilattice L = (A;;_) has the property (as it will be in the sequel) that all sets in A are acceptable,
then ; 2 A is the smallest element of . Birkho¤ (page 23, 1979) shows that any join-semilattice with a
smallest element is also a lattice. Hence, L = (A;;_) is indeed a lattice (i.e., a join-semilattice with the
property that every pair of sets has a geatest lower bound). Since for our pourpose the interesting binary
operation is the join _, not the meet ^, we will not emphasize this fact and still refer to L = (A;;_) as
a semilattice.
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says that the triple (APf ;Pf ;_Pf ) is a semilattice. We call it the semilattice of the choice
of the union.
Proposition 1 Let Pf be a substitutable preference relation. Then, the triple (APf ;Pf
;_Pf ) is a semilattice.
Proof We will show that for all S; S 0 2 APf , lubPf fS; S 0g exists by showing that
lubPf fS; S 0g = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): (4)
Let X = S [ S 0 and Y = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) [ S: Clearly, Ch(X;Pf )  Y  X. Hence, by
condition (2.6) in Blair (1988),13 Ch(X;Pf ) = Ch(Y; Pf ): By denition of Pf , Ch(S [
S 0; Pf ) Pf S. Similarly, Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) Pf S 0. Thus, Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) is an upper bound
of fS; S 0g: Let T be an upper bound of fS; S 0g and assume,
Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) Pf T: (5)
Since T is an upper bound of fS; S 0g, T Pf S and T Pf S 0. By the denition of Pf ,
T = Ch(T [ S; Pf ) = Ch(T [ S 0; Pf ): (6)
Hence, from (5),
Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) = Ch(Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) [ T; Pf ) by the denition of Pf
= Ch(S [ S 0 [ T; Pf ) by Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988)14
= Ch(S [ Ch(S 0 [ T; Pf ); Pf ) by Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988)
= Ch(S [ T; Pf ) by (6)
= T by (6).

Given Pf , we denote by LPf the semilattice of the choice of the union (APf ;Pf ;_Pf )
obtained by conditions (2) and (3). In Example 2 below we show that the conclusion of
Proposition 1 does not hold for non-substitutable preference relations.
13Condition (2.6) in Blair (1988) says that for all Pf and all X;Y 2 2W , Ch(X;Pf )  Y  X implies
Ch(X;Pf ) = Ch(Y; Pf ):
14Proposition 2.3 in Blair (1988) says that the choice set of any substitutable preference relation Pf has
the property that for all X;Y 2 2W , Ch(X [ Y; Pf ) = Ch(Ch(X;Pf ) [ Y; Pf ).
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Example 2 Let W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the set of workers. Consider the preference
relation
Pf
fw1; w2g
fw3; w4g
fw4g
fw3g
fw1g
fw2g
;:
Observe that Pf is not substitutable because w1 2 Ch(fw1; w2; w3; w4g; Pf ) and w1 =2
Ch(fw1; w3; w4g; Pf ). Note that APf = ffw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw1g; fw2g; fw3g; fw4g; ;g.
Since Ch(fw1g [ fw2g; Pf ) = fw1; w2g, Ch(fw1g [ fw2g; Pf ) is neither fw1g nor fw2g
and since Ch(fw3g [ fw4g; Pf ) = fw3; w4g, Ch(fw3g [ fw4g; Pf ) is neither fw3g nor
fw4g. Thus, fw1g Pf fw2g; fw2g Pf fw1g; fw3g Pf fw4g; and fw4g Pf fw3g:
On the other hand, Ch(fw1g [ fwig; Pf ) = Ch(fw2g [ fwig; Pf ) = fwig; for i = 3; 4;
imply fw4g Pf fw1g; fw4g Pf fw2g; fw3g Pf fw1g; and fw3g Pf fw2g: Thus,
fw3g; fw4g 2 ubPf ffw1g; fw2gg. Since fw3g and fw4g are not ordered through Pf and
fw1; w2g Pf fwig and fw3; w4g Pf fwig, for i = 3; 4; lubPf ffw1g; fw2gg does not exist.
Hence, the partial order Pf on APf is not a semilattice. 
Since the partial order Pf inherits rationality properties of the choice sets, it may also
satisfy some additional properties.
First, to dene the notion of stability of a matching  we have assumed that a rm f has
the possibility, when confronted with the set (f), of choosing the best subset of workers
in (f) according to Pf . Hence, we would like that the semilattice LPf has the following
property.
Denition 5 A semilattice L = (A;;_) is individually rational if for all S; S 0 2 A such
that S 0  S, S  S 0:
Note that if a semilattice L = (A;;_) is individually rational then A only contains
acceptable subsets of workers.
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Second, given a semilattice L = (A;;_) we want that, for any two subsets S; S 0 2 A,
the least upper bound of fS; S 0g coincides with the least upper bound of the family of
subsets of S [ S 0 in A and, in turn, it is a subset of S [ S 0.
Denition 6 A semilattice L = (A;;_) is ordered if for all S; S 0 2 A; lubfS; S 0g =
lubfT 2 A j T  S [ S 0g  S [ S 0:
In Example 3 below we illustrate the two notions.
Example 3 LetW = fw1; w2; w3g be the set of workers and assume that the subfamily of
subsets is A = ffw1; w2g; fw2; w3g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w2; w3g; ;g  2W : Consider the following
partial order  on A

;
fw1; w2g fw2; w3g
fw1; w3g
fw1; w2; w3g
The semilattice L = (A;;_) is individually rational but it is not ordered since
lubffw1; w2g; fw1; w3gg = fw1; w3g 6= fw1; w2; w3g = lubfT 2 A j T  fw1; w2g [
fw1; w3gg. Consider now the partial order 0 on A
14
0
;
fw1; w2g fw1; w3g fw2; w3g
fw1; w2; w3g
The semilattice L0 = (A;0;_0) is individually rational and ordered since
lub0ffw1; w2g; fw1; w3gg = lubfT 2 A j T  fw1; w2g [ fw1; w3gg = fw1; w2; w3g. 
Finally, we will need the notion of a closed semilattice.
Denition 7 A semilattice L = (A;;_) is closed if S 2 A and S 0  S imply S 0 2 A:
Observe that neither L = (A;;_) nor L0 = (A;0;_0) in Example 3 are closed. How-
ever, the semilattice L00 = (A00;00;_00), where A00 = 2fw1;w2;w3g and 00 is the following
partial order on A00
00
;
fw1g fw2g fw3g
fw1; w2g fw1; w3g fw2; w3g
fw1; w2; w3g
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is individually rational, ordered, and closed.
4 Preliminary Results and Strong Extensions
Our next result says that the semilattice of the choice of the union LPf = (APf ;Pf ;_Pf )
obtained from a substitutable preference relation Pf by conditions (2) and (3) is individually
rational, ordered, and closed.
Proposition 2 Let Pf be a substitutable preference relation on 2W : Then, LPf = (APf ;Pf
;_Pf ) is individually rational, ordered, and closed.
Proof The semilattice LPf = (APf ;Pf ;_Pf ) is individual rational trivially.
To show that it is ordered, let S; S 0 2 APf : First, as we have already argued when
showing that LPf is a semilattice, condition (4) holds; i.e.,
lubPf fS; S 0g = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ):
We claim that
Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) = lubPf fT 2 APf j T  S [ S 0g: (7)
To see it, note that Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) Pf T for all T 2 APf such that T  S [ S 0. By the
denition of APf , Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ) 2 fT 2 APf j T  S [ S 0g: Hence, (7) follows.
To show that LPf is closed suppose that S 2 APf and S 0  S. By denition of APf ,
S = Ch(S; Pf ). Since Pf is substitutable, for any w 2 S; Ch(Snfwg; Pf ) = Snfwg:
Iterating this property, if necessary, we obtain that S 0 = Ch(S 0; Pf ): Hence, S 0 2 APf .
Thus, LPf is closed. 
Now, we will change our point of view. Previously, starting from a substitutable prefer-
ence relation Pf we eliminated some orderings in Pf and constructed, using conditions (2)
and (3), an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice (APf ;Pf ;_Pf ). Consider
now a semilattice L = (A;;_). Since  may leave some pairs S; S 0 2 A unordered, we
may complete  to make it a preference relation. A particular way (there are many) of
completing  will be called a strong extension of the semilattice.
Denition 8 Let f 2 F be given. A preference relation Pf on 2W is a strong extension
of the semilattice L = (A;;_) if the following two properties hold:
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(E.1) For all S; S 0 2 A; S 0  S implies S 0PfS:
(E.2) If S =2 A; then there exists S 0 2 A such that S 0  S and S 0PfS:
Denition 8 can be interpreted as a set of instructions on how to extend a partial order
on A to a complete preference relation on 2W : First, it has to keep all already existing or-
derings (this corresponds to the standard notion of an extension of a partial order as used
by Szpilrajn (1930)). Second, if a set is not an element of A; then we have freedom but
the set has to be worse than one of its subsets in A (for instance, the empty set). Finally,
pairs of sets in A that are not ordered by  can be freely ordered. The fact ; 2 A guar-
antees that, given a semilattice, we can always nd a strong extension. Again, conditions
(E.1) and (E.2) do not uniquely identify a preference relation as a strong extension of a
semilattice. The preferences Pf2 and P
0
f2
in Example 1 are strong extensions of Pf2 while
P 00f2 is not. Our main goal below will be to identify for each rm equivalence classes of
substitutable preference relations with the property that all members in the same class are
strong extensions of the same semilattice.
The next two results are instrumental and they will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 Let Pf be a strong extension of the semilattice L = (A;;_): Then, for all
S 2 2W , Ch(S; Pf ) 2 A:
Proof Assume S 2 2W is such that Ch(S; Pf ) =2 A. Since Pf is a strong extension of L,
there exists S 0 2 A; S 0  Ch(S; Pf ) such that
S 0PfCh(S; Pf ):
But S 0  S contradicts the denition of choice set, because Ch(S; Pf ) is the most preferred
subset of S according to Pf : 
Lemma 2 Assume L = (A;;_) is an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilat-
tice. Then, for all S; S 0 2 A and all w 2 S _ S 0, w 2 S _ fwg.
Proof Assume otherwise; that is, there exist S; S 0 2 A and w 2 S _ S 0 such that w =2
S _ fwg: Observe that, by closedness, fwg 2 A: We will show that
S = S _ fwg: (8)
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By denition of _ and orderedness, S_fwg = lubfS; fwgg  S[fwg: Since, by hypothesis,
w =2 S _ fwg; S _ fwg  S: On the other hand, by individual rationality, S  S _ fwg: By
the denition of _, S _ fwg  S: Hence, (8) holds.
Dene R = (S _ S 0)nfwg. By closedness, R 2 A: By (8), R _ S = R _ (S _ fwg). By
orderedness, R _ (S _ fwg)  R [ (S _ fwg). Hence, and since w =2 R and w =2 S _ fwg,
w =2 R _ S  S [ S 0 and w 2 S [ S 0. Thus,
S _ S 0  R _ S: (9)
Therefore,
R _ S _ fwg = R _ S by (8)
 S _ S 0 by (9).
Now, we claim that
R _ fwg = S _ S 0: (10)
First, by orderedness, R_fwg  R[fwg, and by denition of R, R[fwg = S_S 0: Hence,
by orderedness, R_fwg  S_S 0: By closedness, S_S 0  R_fwg: Second, by orderedness,
R _ fwg = lubfT 2 A j T  R [ fwgg: By denition of R; R _ fwg = lubfT 2 A j T 
S _ S 0g: Thus, R _ fwg  S _ S 0: The two orderings imply that (10) holds. Therefore,
R _ S _ fwg = R _ fwg _ S because _ is commutative
= (S _ S 0) _ S by (10)
= S _ S 0 because _ is commutative and idempotent,
which contradicts that R _ S _ fwg  S _ S 0. 
In Proposition 3 we say that all strong extensions of individually rational, ordered, and
closed semilattices are substitutable.
Proposition 3 Let L = (A;;_) be an individually rational, ordered, and closed semi-
lattice and assume Pf is a strong extension of L. Then, Pf is substitutable.
Proof Assume Pf is not substitutable. Then, there exist S and w;w0 2 S (w 6= w0) such
that w 2 Ch(S; Pf )  S and
w =2 Ch(Snfw0g; Pf )  S 0: (11)
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By Lemma 1, S; S 0 2 A:We will prove that S = S_ S 0: Assume otherwise; then,   S _ S 0 
S. Since Pf is a strong extension of L, 
S _ S 0Pf S; (12)
but
S _ S 0  S [ S 0  S: (13)
The rst inclusion holds because L is ordered and the second one by the denition of the
choice set. Conditions (12) and (13) contradict that Ch(S; Pf ) = S: Hence, w 2 S _ S 0:
Because L is closed, fwg 2 A. By Lemma 2, w 2 S 0 _ fwg. Hence, and since w =2 S 0,
S 0 _ fwg  S 0: Thus, because Pf is a strong extension of L,
( S 0 _ fwg)Pf S 0: (14)
By orderedness, S 0 _ fwg  S 0 [ fwg. Moreover, Snfw0g  S 0 [ fwg since S 0  Snfw0g
and w 2 Snfw0g: Then, (14) contradicts that Ch(Snfw0g; Pf ) = S 0: 
The non closed semilattice L0 = (A;0;_0) of Example 3 shows that there are strong
extensions of individually rational and ordered semilattices that are not substitutable. For
instance, the strong extension
P 0f
fw1; w2; w3g
fw1; w2g
fw1; w3g
fw2; w3g
;
is not substitutable since w1 2 Ch(fw1; w2g; Pf ) while w1 =2 Ch(fw1g; Pf ) = ;.
In Proposition 4 we state that the following consistency property holds. Suppose we
start with an individually rational, ordered, and closed semilattice, and strongly extend
it. Then, using conditions (2) and (3), we can construct from this strong extension the
semilattice of the choice of the union. Then, this semilattice coincides with the semilattice
that we started with. Formally,
Proposition 4 Let Pf be a strong extension of an individually rational, ordered, and
closed semilattice L = (A;;_). Then, L = (APf ;Pf ;_Pf ).
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Proof First, we will show that A = APf : By Lemma 1, APf  A: Now, we show that if
S 2 A then S 2 APf : Assume S =2 APf ; i.e., S 6= Ch(S; Pf ): By Lemma 1, Ch(S; Pf ) 2
A: Since L is individually rational and S  Ch(S; Pf ), S  Ch(S; Pf ): Since Pf is a
strong extension of L, SRfCh(S; Pf ). But, S 6= Ch(S; Pf ) implies SPfCh(S; Pf ), which
contradicts the denition of the choice set. Thus, A  APf :
Second, we will show that if S; S 0 2 A then S _ S 0 = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): By Lemma 1,
Ch(S [S 0; Pf ) 2 A: Since Ch(S [S 0; Pf )  S [S 0 and S _S 0 = lubfT 2 A j T  S [S 0g,
by orderedness, (S _ S 0)  Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): Since Pf is a strong extension of L,
(S _ S 0)RfCh(S [ S 0; Pf ): (15)
Since L is ordered, (S _ S 0)  (S [ S 0). Thus,
Ch(S [ S 0; Pf )Rf (S _ S 0): (16)
Conditions (15) and (16) imply that
S _ S 0 = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): (17)
By the denition of _Pf , S _Pf S 0 = lubPf fS; S 0g. By condition (4), S _Pf S 0 = Ch(S [
S 0; Pf ): By (17), S _ S 0 = S _Pf S 0: 
5 The Invariance Result
We are now ready to state and prove our main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Let Pf and P 0f be two substitutable preference relations of f 2 F . Then,
LPf = LP 0f if and only if S(Pf ; P f ) = S(P
0
f ; P f ) for all substitutable P f .
Proof ()) Let Pf and P 0f be two substitutable preference relations such that LPf = LP 0f .
Assume that P f and  are such that  2 S(Pf ; P f ): Then,  2 IR(Pf ; P f ). Hence, for
all f^ 2 F and all w 2 W;
(f^) = Ch((f^); Pf^ ) and (w)Rw;: (18)
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By Lemma 1, (f) 2 APf : Then, APf = AP 0f implies (f) = Ch((f); P 0f ): Condition (18)
implies that  2 IR(P 0f ; P f ): Assume  =2 S(P 0f ; P f ). Then, there exist f^ and w such
that (f^ ; w) blocks  at P 0 = (P 0f ; P f ); i.e., w =2 (f^);
f^P 0w(w) (19)
and
w 2 Ch((f^) [ fwg; P 0
f^
): (20)
Since P 0w = Pw, (19) is equivalent to
f^Pw(w): (21)
If f^ 6= f; then (f^ ; w) blocks  at (Pf ; P f ), which contradicts that  2 S(Pf ; P f ): Hence,
f^ = f: By Lemma 1, Ch((f)[fwg; P 0f ) 2 AP 0f ; and since, by Proposition 2, the semilattice
LP 0f is closed, fwg 2 AP 0f : Condition (20) and w =2 (f) imply
((f) _P 0f fwg) P 0f (f): (22)
By fPw(w) and  2 S(Pf ; P f ), (20) implies
(f) = (f) _Pf fwg: (23)
This contradicts (22) because LPf = LP 0f . Then, S(Pf ; P f )  S(P 0f ; P f ):Hence, S(Pf ; P f ) =
S(P 0f ; P f ):
(() Let Pf and P 0f be two substitutable preference relations and assume S(Pf ; P f ) =
S(P 0f ; P f ) for all substitutable P f . To show that LPf = LP 0f ; we rst show S 2 APf if and
only if S 2 AP 0f : Consider the following preference prole P f : for all w 2 S, all w0 =2 S;
and all f^ 6= f ,
Pw Pw0 Pf^
f ; ;
;:
The unique stable matching at (Pf ; P f ) is ; where (f) = S and (f^) = ; for all f^ 6= f
(obviously, (w0) = ; for all w0 =2 S): By hypothesis, S(Pf ; P f ) = S(P 0f ; P f ): Hence, 
is individually rational at (P 0f ; P f ): Then, S = (f) = Ch((f); P
0
f ) = Ch(S; P
0
f ). By
Lemma 1, S 2 APf :
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To prove that Pf=P 0f ; we will rst show that for any S1; S2 2 APf ,
S1 = S1 _Pf S2 if and only if S1 = S1 _P 0f S2: (24)
Observe that if F = ffg then the result follows trivially by the denitions of Pf and P 0f .
Thus, assume jF j  2. Consider any preference prole P f where, for a rm f 0 6= f , for all
w 2 S1nS2; all w0 2 S1 \ S2; all w00 2 S2nS1; all w000 =2 S1 [ S2; and all f^ 6= f; f 0,
Pw Pw0 Pw00 Pw000 Pf 0 Pf^
f 0 f f ; S2nS1 ;
f ; f 0 :::
; ; S1nS2
:::
;:
Observe that Pf 0 is not fully described and it may be completed by keeping it substitutable.
By S1 = S1 _Pf S2, Ch(S1; Pf ) = S1: We claim that for all T  S1, Ch(T; Pf ) \ (S2nS1) =
;. Assume w 2 Ch(T; Pf ) \ (S2nS1) 6= ; for some T  S1. By substitutability of Pf ,
w 2 Ch(T; Pf ) implies that w 2 Ch(S1; Pf ): Since w 2 S2nS1; w =2 S1, contradicting
that Ch(S1 [ S2; Pf ) = S1; which holds because S1 = S1 _Pf S2. Thus, the rms-optimal
stable matching F 2 S(Pf ; P f ) is F (f) = S1, F (f 0) = S2nS1, and F (f^) = ; for all
f^ 6= f; f 0: To see that, consider the deferred-acceptance algorithm in which rms propose.
Observe rst that f 0 proposes in the rst step of the algorithm to S2nS1; and all these o¤ers
are accepted. Moreover, at any step of the algorithm in which f proposes, it proposes to
Ch(W 0; Pf ) for some set of workers W 0, where W 0  S1; this is because all workers in S1
only receive o¤ers from f and all workers in S1nS2 do not receive o¤ers from f 0 since f 0
does not make any o¤er to the workers in S1, and none of the other rms (if any) makes
any o¤er. By hypothesis, S(Pf ; P f ) = S(P 0f ; P f ): Hence, F 2 S(P 0f ; P f ): Moreover,
S1 = F (f) = Ch(F (f); P
0
f ): Assume that S1 6= S1 _P 0f S2: Then, there exists w00 2 S2nS1
such that w00 2 S1 _P 0f S2: By Lemma 2, w00 2 S1 _P 0f fw00g. Then, S1 _P 0f fw00g P 0f S1:
Because LP 0f is closed, w
00 2 AP 0f . By denition of LP 0f , S1 _P 0f fw00g P 0f S1 implies
(S1 _P 0f fw00g)P 0fS1: Then, w00 2 Ch(F (f) [ fw00g; P 0f ): But fPw00f 0; because w00 2 S2nS1:
Thus, (f; w00) blocks F at (P
0
f ; P f ); which contradicts that F 2 S(P 0f ; P f ): Hence,
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S1 = S1 _P 0f S2. Finally,
S1 Pf S2 () S1 = S1 _Pf S2 by condition (3) and orderedness of LPf
() S1 = S1 _P 0f S2 by (24)
() S1 P 0f S2 by condition (3) and orderedness of LP 0f .
Thus, LPf = LP 0f because APf = AP 0f and Pf=P 0f implies _Pf = _P 0f : 
Our result on the invariance of the set of stable matchings requires substitutability. In
Example 4 we show that there are two non-substitutable preference relations Pf and P 0f
with the property that S(Pf ; P f ) = S(P 0f ; P f ) for all P f but LPf 6= LP 0f .
Example 4 Let W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the set of workers and let f 2 F . Consider the
two preference relations
Pf P
0
f
fw1; w2g fw3; w4g
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g
; ;:
Observe that neither Pf nor P 0f are substitutable. Moreover, although APf = AP 0f =
ffw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; ;g  2W the two semilattices of the choice of the union obtained by
conditions (2) and (3) from Pf and P 0f are di¤erent and, respectively, equal to
Pf P 0f
;
fw3; w4g
fw1; w2g
;
fw1; w2g
fw3; w4g
Hence, LPf 6= LP 0f . Let P f be arbitrary. Assume  2 S(Pf ; P f ): We will show that
 2 S(P 0f ; P f ): First, assume  =2 S(P 0f ; P f ) and let P 0 = (P 0f ; P f ): Since IR(Pf ; P f ) =
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IR(P 0f ; P f ), there exist f^ 2 F and w 2 W such that (f^ ; w) blocks  at (P 0f ; P f ); i.e.,
f^P 0w(w) (25)
and
w 2 Ch((f^) [ fwg; P 0
f^
):
Since Pw = P 0w, (25) implies f^Pw(w). If f^ 6= f; then (f^ ; w) blocks  at (Pf ; P f ) and
this contradicts that  2 S(Pf ; P f ): Hence, f^ = f . We consider the following three cases,
depending on the set (f):
Case 1: (f) = fw1; w2g: Then, for all w =2 (f); (f) = Ch((f) [ fwg; P 0f ): Thus, for all
w =2 (f), (f; w) does not block  at (P 0f ; P f ):
Case 2: (f) = fw3; w4g: Then, for all w =2 (f), (f) = Ch((f) [ fwg; P 0f ): Thus, for all
w =2 (f), (f; w) does not block  at (P 0f ; P f ):
Case 3: (f) = ;: Then, for all w =2 (f); we have that (f) = Ch((f) [ fwg; P 0f ): Thus,
for all w =2 (f), (f; w) does not block  at (P 0f ; P f ):
These three cases show that S(Pf ; P f )  S(P 0f ; P f ): Using a similar argument we can
show that S(P 0f ; P f )  S(Pf ; P f ): Then, for all P f , S(Pf ; P f ) = S(P 0f ; P f ); and
LPf 6= LP 0f : 
6 Concluding Remark
The main implication of Theorem 1 is the following. Let P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm) be
a substitutable prole of preference relations of agents. For each fi 2 F , i = 1; ::; n, Pfi is
a complete order on a set of cardinality 2jW j. Identify, using (2), the subfamily of subsets
of workers APfi that are the choice of themselves. Construct, using (3), the partial order
Pfi on APfi . All information needed to compute the set of stable matchings at prefer-
ence prole P is embedded in the prole = (Pf1 ; :::;Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm). Moreover, any
preference prole P 0 = (P 0f1 ; :::; P
0
fn
;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm) such that P 0fi=Pfi for all i = 1; :::; n
has the property that S(P ) = S(P 0). Hence, we can partition the set of substitutable
preference proles into equivalence classes in such a way that all preference proles in the
same class have the same set of stable matchings. A prole = (f1 ; :::;fn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
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of partial orders may be used as the representative of each class. All substitutable pref-
erence proles in which preference relations of rms are strong extensions of their corre-
sponding partial order belong to the same equivalence class (see the gure below). Thus,
any centralized mechanism that proposes a stable matching for each preference prole
P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm) can use as input, instead, the corresponding prole of par-
tial orders = (Pf1 ; :::;Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm).
Set of substitutable preference proles Representative
 P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
 ...
 P 0 = (P 0f1 ; :::; P 0fn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
 ! = (f1 ; :::;fn ;Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
S(P ) = ::: = S(P 0)
::: :::
 P = ( Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ; Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
 ...
 P 0 = ( P 0f1 ; :::; P 0fn ; Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
 !
 = (f1 ; :::; fn ; Pw1 ; :::; Pwm)
S( P ) = ::: = S( P 0)
::: :::
 P^ = (P^f1 ; :::; P^fn ; P^w1 ; :::; P^wm)
 ...
 P^ 0 = (P^ 0f1 ; :::; P^ 0fn ; P^w1 ; :::; P^wm)
 ! ^ = (^f1 ; :::; ^fn ; P^w1 ; :::; P^wm)
S(P^ ) = ::: = S(P^ 0)
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